Freed Finance Company v. W. J. Preece, William V. Preece and Preece Motor, Inc. : Brief of Appellant on Appeal by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1963
Freed Finance Company v. W. J. Preece, William V.
Preece and Preece Motor, Inc. : Brief of Appellant
on Appeal
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Moyle & Moyle; Attorneys for Appellant;
Callister & Kesler; Mark Boyle; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Freed Finance Co. v. Preece, No. 9858 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4198
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE0£0~efr4HL. E D 
FREED FINANCE COMPANY, wP? 2 5 \So3 
a corporation, -------·-···· -- -------··-------~-c~~rt--li~h"-
Plaintiff and Respondenf}er Suprem ' 
vs. 
W. J. PREECE, WILLIAM V. Case No. 9858 
PREECE and PREECE MOTOR, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendants, 
WILLIAM V. PRE,ECE, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
UNiVE~SITY OF l 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third District Co?rt for Salt Lake Count~~('T , ~·- ·c .,_ 
Hon. Merrill C. Faux, Judge ._; ,_, i~ ~ lJb~ 
CALLISTER & KESLER 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
MOYLE & MOYLE LAw LIBRI~R 
810 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for William V. Preece 
Appellant 
Attorneys for Freed Finance Company 
Plaintiff -Respondent 
MARK BOYLE 
345 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for W. J. Preece & Preece 
Motor, Inc., a corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEM'ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE -------------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN DOWER COURT ---------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON .NPPE~L -------------------------------- 2 
STATE'MENT OF FACTS -------------------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT 
PRE'LI'MINARY ARGUMENT---------------------------------------- 11 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLD-
ING THAT THE 1POWER OF ATTORNEY AND 
THE AGENCY HAD NOT BEEN TERMINAT-
ED PRIOR TO THE UN.NUTHORIZED SIGN-
ING OF THE GUARANTEE. ------------------------------ 13 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLD-
ING THAT THE SIGNING OF THE GUARAN-
TEE WAS WITHIN THE PURPOSE OR IN-
TENT OF THE POWER OF ATTORNEY AND 
THE AGENCY CREATED THEREBY. ____________ 19 
POINT III. THE TRIAL ~COURT ERRED IN AD-
MITTING THE 'POWER OF ATTORNEY IN 
EVIDENCE. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 21 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------- '22 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
Howard vs. National Copper Bank, et al (1933) 81 
Utah 493, 20 P.2d 610 -------------------------------------------- 20 
Huntsman vs. Huntsman (1920) 56 Utah 609, 192 
P. 368 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20 
Texts and Annotations 
2 Am. Jur. 50 Agency, Sec. 56 ____________________________________ 12, 21 
2 Calif. Jurisprudence 2d, page 772, Agency, Sec. 104__ '19 
2 CJS 1148, Agency, Sec. 68 ------------------------------------------ 16 
2 CJS 1152, Agency, S~c. 72 ------------------------------------------ 16 
2 CJS 1220, Agency, Sec. 97 ______________________________________ 13, 18 
2 CJS 1222, Agency, Sec. 98 ------------------------------------------ 16 
2 CJS 1229, Agency, Sec. 99 ------------------------------------------ 20 
Restatement of Agency, 2d Eel., Sec. 106 ________________________ 12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FREED FINANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
W. J. PREECE, WILLIAM V. Case No. 9858 
PREECE and PREECE MOTOR, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendants, 
WILLIAM V. PREECE, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought to enforce payment of 
an indebtedness claimed due from defendants aris-
ing from the purchase of conditional sales contracts 
and notes receivable. The individual defendants, 
W. J. Preece and William V. Preece were alleged to 
have executed and delivered a written guarantee 
and waiver assuming the corporate indebtedness. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Preece Motor, Inc., a corporation, ~and W. J. 
Preece, defendants, stipulated in open court that if 
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proof were adduced that $10,000.00 would be found 
to be due and owing Freed Finance Company from 
Preece Motor, Inc. W. J. Preece and Preece Motor, 
Inc. accordingly stipulated that judgment could be 
entered against each of them for that amount. Judg-
ment was entered against defendant William V. 
Preece on the basis of a purported guarantee signed 
by his son, W. J. Preece, 'and 'said defendant, William 
V. Preece, ·appeals from that judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant, William V. Preece, seeks 
reversal of the judgment entered against him and 
dismissal of the action as against him. 
STATEMEN·T OF FACTS 
During the early part of 1960 the plaintiff 
respondent, Freed Finance Company, hereinafter 
referred to as "Freed," notified Preece Motor, Inc. 
and W. J. Preece that it would not continue to pur-
chase conditional sales contracts and accounts re-
ceivable from that corporation unless the defendants 
W. J. Preece and William V. Preece personally guar-
anteed the payment of all such obligations due or to 
become due to Freed (Tr. 15-16). 
M. R. Weiler, the only agent of Freed who testi-
fied, stated that he did not have any conversation 
with appellant William V. Preece, hereinafter re-
ferred to as "Preece, Sr.," with regard to signing 
the guarantee, and that the document later intro-
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duced into evidence (over appellants' objection) as 
"Exhibit 1-P" was not signed in his presence (Tr. 
18). Weiler also testified that W. J. Preece, the son 
of Preece, Sr., delivered the guarantee (Exhibit 1-
P) to him without any explanation or conversation 
(Tr. 17). W. J. Preece testified that his signature 
appeared on the guarantee (Tr. 21) and that he had 
been asked to obtain his father's signature but that 
he had signed his father's (Preece, Sr.) name on it, 
thinking that he had some kind of a power of attor-
ney to sign (Tr. 21, .22). 
The son, W. J. Preece, testified that the only 
documents he had signed his father's name to prior to 
this time under a power of attorney consisted of en-
dorsing some checks that were made out to him 
(Preece, Sr.) while he (Preece, Sr.) was on a mission 
some years before (Tr. 23). Preece, Sr. objected to 
the admission of the power of attorney (Tr. 24) 
and upon voir dire examination W. J. Preece (the 
son) testified as follows: 
"BY MR. RITCHIE: 
"Q. Mr. Preece, the date set out in this 
power of attorney is February, 1954, is that 
correct? 
"A. Yes, it is. 
"Q. When was that with relation to the 
time your father went on a mission? 
"A. This was just prior to his going. 
"Q. And this was executed within how 
long before he left on his mission? 
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"A. I would say within a week or two. 
"Q. And where did he go on his mission? 
"A. To England. 
"Q. And when did he return from his 
mission? 
"A. Well, it was probably in the fall of 
'56. 
"Q. Now, do you recall it would have 
been 1955, would it not, he was over there just 
slightly over eighteen months, is that correct? 
"A. No, just slightly over two years. 
"A. Now, was your father, William V. 
Preece, present when this document was 
drafted? 
"A. I don't recall. 
"Q. Well, if he had have been, he would 
have had the correct name in there, would he 
not? 
Well, that is maybe argument. Did you 
actually make arrangements for the obtaining 
of this power of attorney? 
"A. Did I make arrangements? 
"Q. Yes. 
"A. Yes, I did with my father. 
"Q. And the purpose of this power of 
attorney was so that you could handle his 
affairs during the time he was on his mission, 
is that correct? 
"A. That's correct." 
Thereupon objection to its admissibility was 
renewed on the further ground that the power of 
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attorney was given to be used only for the duration 
of a trip abroad during which time Preece, Sr., was 
serving a mission and it expired by its own terms 
and by operaion of law upon Preece, Sr.'s return 
from his mission. The objection of Preece, Sr., was 
renewed as follows: 
"MR. RITCHIE: Renew my objection, 
Your Honor, and object on the further ground 
that inasmuch as this power of attorney was 
given only for the purpose of taking care of 
Mr. Preece, Sr.'s affairs during the time that 
he was on a mission and it expired by its own 
terms upon his return in 1955 or '56, whatever 
the date may have been, and at the time of 
the alleged occurrence it was not in force. 
"MR. CALLISTER: Fine, we will so 
stipulate if counsel will. Will you so stipulate, 
Mr. Boyle?" (Tr. 26, 27) 
Freed's only witnesses at the trial, other than 
M. R. Weiler, were the defendants W. J. Preece and 
Preece, Sr., who were called as Freed's witnesses. 
There was no testimony or evidence introduced by 
Freed to show that Freed had any knowledge of, or 
relied upon the power of attorney (Ex. 2-P, Tr. 15-
18). Further Freed did not know that a power of 
attorney had ever been given until long after the 
action was started and did not allege that the guar-
antee had been signed by a purported attorney-in-
fact. On the other hand, Preece, Sr., did not know 
of the existence of the guarantee (Ex. 1-P) until 
after the litigation was commenced as his son did 
not advise him that he had signed it (Tr. 37). The 
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court ruled that there was no evidence that defend-
ant Preece, Sr. signed the guarantee (Ex. 1-P, Tr. 
52). W. J. Preece testified as to conversations with 
his father with respect to Exhibit 2-P which took 
place before Preece, Sr. went on his mission (Tr. 31-
34). W. J. Preece testified that it was Preece, Sr.'s 
idea that he (the son) was to have his power of at-
torney so he could handle his financiral affairs while 
he, Preece, Sr., was away on his mission. He repeat-
edly testified that the power of attorney was given 
him by his f 1ather (Preece, Sr.) to use while Preece 
Sr. was on a mission ('Tr 31-34). 
In response to questions by Freed's counsel, W. 
J. Preece testified as follows (Tr. 34): 
"Q. Now when this power of attorney 
was given to you by your father, he was going 
to England on a mission and he had certain 
things to be done during his absence, isn't 
that correct? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Now since he returned from his mis-
sion did you exercise the power of attorney? 
"A. No, sir, I hadn't ever used it. 
"Q. And you had never used it? 
"A. Right." 
W. J. Preece testified that he did not exercise 
the power of attorney at any time after his father 
returned from his mission other than in signing the 
proposed Exhibit 1-P, and that the only time he 
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attempted to exercise the power while his father 
was on a n1ission in 1954 and 1955 was in endorsing 
some checks on his behalf (Tr. 35). 
Preece, Sr. testified that he left on a mission to 
England on the first of February, 1954, and returned 
in Septe1nber of 1955. He further stated that he 
did not sign proposed Exhibit 1-P nor did he author-
ize anyone to sign it on his behalf at any time (Tr. 
37, 44). 
William V. Preece testified concerning the 
power of attorney as follows (starting at Tr. 39): 
"Q. (By Mr. Callister) Mr. Preece, I 
hand you what has been introduced as plain-
tiff's Exhibit 2-P and ask you if you had pre 
pared for you a power of attorney during 
the calendar month of February, 1954? 
"A. Yes, I asked for this. 
"Q. And who did you employ, if any, to 
prepare it for you? 
"A. Well, Bill said he would take care 
of it and he brought the blank to me and I 
signed it. 
"Q. Now did you have any conversation 
with your son, William J. Preece, as to that 
power of attorney? 
"A. No, no more than just I wanted him 
to have the power of attorney while I \Vas on 
my mission, while I was away. 
"Q. Well now, just tell us whether or not 
you had a conversation with him as to the 
time limit of this power of attorney? 
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"A. I don't remember any conversation 
to that effect. 
"Q. Well, am I led to believe that there 
was no discussion at all between you and Mr. 
W. J. Preece as to this power of attorney 
other than just having it prepared? 
"A. Well, it was just my intent and my 
wife's too that we have him have that power 
of attorney while we were gone." 
William V. Preece further testified (Tr. 42): 
"Q. (By Mr. Callister) Was this power 
of attorney to continue until you made a modi-
fiation or change of it? 
"A. No, I just signed the bl1ank figuring 
at the time I was gone on my mission that this 
was in effect and that was it. 
* * * 
On cross examination at Tr. 42: 
"Q. (By Mr. Ritchie) Now, Mr. Preece, 
did you at about the time this power of attor-
ney was given have a conversation with your 
son Bill Preece, to the effect at which time 
he said that maybe it was the best way to 
handle affairs was for you to have a power 
of attorney while you were away? 
"A. Yes, yes, we did. 
"Q. Now what else was said at that time 
during that conversation? 
* * * 
"Q. (By Mr. Ritchie) Now wasn't there 
some discussion at about the time the power 
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of attorney was given with reference to his 
handling checks to be deposited to your ac-
count during the time you were away? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And what did you instruct him at 
that time with reference to those checks? 
"A. W·ell, just sign them and send them 
to me or put them into my account. 
"Q. So that you could pay your expenses 
while you were on a mission? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. Now was it during that conversa-
tion that the necessity for the power of at-
torney came up? 
"A. Well, I don't just remember exactly 
whether that was at that time or not but we 
talked it over previously and we thought that 
was the best way to handle it. 
"Q. Then in fact, if you know, did your 
son, W. J. Preece actually use . this power of 
attorney in connection with depositing checks 
and matters like that? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And was that during what period, 
Mr. Preece? 
"A. Well, that was during the period 
of '54 and '55 when I was on a mission. 
"Q. And since tha:t time has he exercised 
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any powers on your behalf pursuant to this 
power of attorney? 
"A. Nothing that I know of except this. 
"Q. Well, this purported signature of 
the guarantee in this lawsuit was the only 
item, or the only matter with which you are 
acquainted where he attempted to exercise 
that power after you returned from your 
mission, is that correct? 
"A. That'~s right. 
"Q. Now did W. J. Preece ever conduct 
on your behalf after you returned from your 
mission any other business other than that? 
"A. Not to sign my name. 
"Q. And specifically with reference to 
this guarantee, did you authorize him or re-
quest him to sign your name to that docu-
ment? 
"A. No, I didn't. 
"Q. What was the reason that you didn't 
take any steps to terminate this power of at-
torney after you returned from your 1nission? 
"A. Well, we just never done anything 
about it, just thought it was terminated. That 
was the agreement. That is what we had 
talked over. That was the understanding, my 
understanding that that is what it was for is 
when I was gone. 
"Q. And so at the time the power of at-
torney was given, then it was given in the 
close relationship to the time you left on your 
mission and it was assumed that it was given 
for that purpose only, is that correct? 
"A. Yes, sir." ('Tr. 42-44). 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Again on redirect examination Mr. William V. 
Preece repeatedly testified that the power of at-
torney was given for the purpose of handling his 
affairs only during the time he was away on his mis-
sion, and with the understanding that it was to be 
used only while he was gone (Tr. 45). Preece, Sr. 
further testified that he discussed the necessity of 
having a power of attorney and the understanding 
was that W. J. Preece could carry on if something 
came up pertaining to his affairs while he was away 
(Tr. 46). 
Preece Sr. and Freed, through their counsel, 
stipulated that if evidence were adduced Freed could 
prove that $10,000.00 was due and owing from 
Preece Motor, Inc. to Freed as of February 29, 1960. 
Appellant, Preece, Sr. entered into said stipulation 
without admitting in any manner any liability to 
Freed and specifically reserved all rights, including 
the right to appeal and the right to challenge the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
of the trial court ( R. 53). 
ARGUMENT 
Preliminary Argument 
The purported guarantee is the only basis upon 
which Preece, Sr., could be held liable. In order for 
such liability to attach, Freed had the burden of es-
tablishing that the power of attorney (Ex. 2.-P, 
signed in February, 1954) was in force on February 
29, 1960, when Preece, Sr.'s name was, in effect, 
11 
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forged on the guarantee (Ex. 1-P) by his son, W. 
J. Preece, the president of the corporation. Further, 
it was encumbent on Freed to show that the power 
of attorney was broad enough to authorize the pur-
ported agent to act when such action was entirely 
and wholly unrelated to the purpose for which the 
power was given. It is clear that Freed failed to 
sustain this burden, and that the court erroneously 
held the power of attorney to be in full force and 
effect in 1960. 
The guarantee was not signed by Preece, Sr. or 
with his authority ('Tr. 37, 44). The power of at-
torney can be of no help to Freed in establishing 
liability as Freed had no knowledge whatsoever of 
the existence of the power of attorney in February, 
1960, nor wrus there any evidence that it relied on an 
agency. It had expired by operation of law within a 
reasonable time after 1954 regardless of any other 
circumstances. It cannot be denied that a reasonable 
time had expired and that some six years later W. 
J. Preece had no authority to act on behalf of Preece 
Sr. in signing the guarantee. (See Restatement of 
Agency, 2nd Ed., Sec. 106). Further, the law is clear 
that a power of attorney expires upon the accom-
plishment of the authorized act or purpose for which 
it was given by operation of law without more. (See 
2 Am. J ur. 50, Agency, Sec. 56) 
The courts, without exception, hold that in the 
construction of a power of attorney such as is in-
volved here, that it is the intent .and circumstances 
12 
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of the parties at the time the p<nver is given that 
determine the scope and duration of the power. 
(2 C.J.S. 1220, Agency, Sec. 97) The evidence is un-
troverted that the power of attorney was given by 
Preece, Sr. to his son to handle his affairs while on a 
mission for his church, and for no other reason or 
purpose. There is no basis in law or equity to ,affirm 
the decision of the lower court and to follow the 
same would cause h!avoc in normal busine'Ss trans-
actions far beyond comprehension. 
ARGUMENT 
POJjNT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE POWER OF ATTORNEY AND THE AGENCY HAD 
NOT BEEN TERMINATED PRIOR TO THE UNAUTHOR-
IZED SIGNING OF THE GUARANTEE. 
There is no evidence whatsoever that Freed had 
any knowledge of the existence of the power of at-
torney prior to the time of the trial. Therefore, 
there could have been no reliance whatsoever on it 
by Freed. The trial court in its Memorandum Deci-
sion of May 25, 1962 erroneously concluded: 
" ... the father should have terminated 
power when he returned from England if he 
no longer wished his son to exercise that 
power; that he should have destroyed the 
writing that created it. 
"The fact that the son believed he had 
authority to sign his father's name, is, to me, 
some evidence that the authority existed. The 
son, prdba:bly as well as anybody else, knew 
13 
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what was intended when the power of attor-
ney was gran ted to him. 
"Therefore, everything considered, the 
court finds that the authority to act existed 
in the son when he signed; that as between the 
plaintiff and William V. Preece, the fault or 
responsibility for the circumstances which led 
to the extension of credit by plaintiff rests 
upon the latter. By reason thereof that phase 
of the lawsuit should be resolved in favor of 
plaintiff." (R. 44, 45) 
It is conceivable that the result should have 
been as the trial court indicated if Freed had dealt 
with W. J. Preece as the agent of Preece, Sr., with 
his knowledge, or if Preece, Sr. had in any manner 
induced Freed to extend credit based on any repre-
sentations that W. J. Prece was his agent. The law 
under no stretch of the imagination requires notice 
or the physical destruction of the power of attorney 
under circumstances such as are present in this case. 
Further, there are no facts upon which an es-
toppel may be based as there was no evidence of a 
reliance on the power of attorney in any sense of the 
word. On the contl·ary, it is clear that Freed had no 
knowledge of the existence of the po,Yer and on the 
other hand, Preece, Sr. had no kno\vledge that his 
son had signed his name on the guarantee uttil many, 
many months later when the litigation was com-
menced. It would be re111arkable and unique, to say 
the least, as a legal consequence, if liability could 
attach under the circumstances of this case upon any 
14 
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of the theorie's advanced, or otherwise. 
It is simply a matter of Freed attempting to 
take advantage of something that occurred to it as 
an afterthought. It is apparent from reading the 
transcript of the trial that at the outset counsel for 
Freed did not seriously contend that Preece, Sr. 
could be held liable. This is evidenced by the follow-
ing proposal for a stipulation addressed to Mr. Boyle 
as counsel for V/. J. Preece: 
''MR. RI'TCHIE: Renew my objection, 
Your Honor, and object on the further ground 
that inasmuch as this power of attorney was 
given only for the purpose of taking care of 
Mr. Preece, Sr.'s affairs during the time that 
he was on a mission and it expired by its own 
terms upon his return in 1955 or '56, whatever 
the date may ha:ve been, and at the time of the 
alleged occurrence it was not in force. 
"MR. CALLISTER: Fine, we will so stip-
ulate if counsel will. Will you so stipulate, 
Mr. Boyle? 
"MR. BOYLE: I am not in a position to 
stipulate." (Tr. 26, .27) 
The intent of the grantor of the power, i.e., 
Preece, Sr., at the time the power was given, is of 
paramount importance in the determination of this 
matter. The facts and tes~timony compel the conclu-
sion that the power of attorney, according to the 
understanding of the parties 'at the time, 'was limited 
to the accomplishment of a single purpose and 
15 
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given for the duration of Preece, Sr.'s mission only, 
and for no other purpose. 
The decision of the trial court is contrary to 
'all e'Stablished rules of agency and cannot be sus-
tained. 
It is of course basic that the duration of an 
agency depends primarily upon the express or im-
plied agreement between the principal and the agent. 
It is well settled tHat the duration may be implied by 
the purpose of the agency and the circum'Stances of 
the parties. Further the fulfillment of the purpose 
for which the agency is created terminates the 
agency. See 2 CJS 1148, Agency, Sec. 68 and 2 CJS 
115'2, Agency, Sec. 72. 
Certainly there can be no authority express or 
implied upon which the agent had any authority to 
exercise the guarantee in question. The court's at-
tention is directed to the following at 2 CJS 1222, 
Agency, Sec. 98, under General Principles and Con-
struction of Powers of Attorney: 
"Letters or powers of attorney are con-
struable as other contracts in the light of the 
object or purpose of the agreement as mani-
fested by the language used in the attendant 
circumstances, the courts, in construction of 
such instruments, restricting the powers 
granted to such as appertain to the business 
confided to the agent and are exercised in the 
principal's interest, and endeavoring to dis-
cover and effectuate the principal's intention. 
* * * 
"The object of the parties, and more par-
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ticularly that of the principal, to the agree· 
ment should ever be kept in view, and the 
power, although given in general terms, con-
strued subject to, and limited by, the clear and 
obvious intent of the agency therein created; 
the guiding principle of construction is to be 
derived from a consideration of the result 
which the agent is appointed to accomplish. 
·· * * * to be read in the light of 
the surrounding circumstances so as to give 
effect to the evident intention of the principal 
as to the time of the power. It is pe~missible 
to examine all the circumstances under which 
a written authority was executed so far as 
actually or presumably present to the minds 
of the parties for the purpose of enabling 
the court to understand their situation and 
apply their words to the right subject matter 
in light of all attendant conditions. Circum-
stance1s lying in parol may be adduced in this 
connection to aid the construction not by con-
trolling the terms as set down but by securing 
their application to the proper objects. Where 
the instrument sets out or explains the cir-
cumstances under which it was executed, it is 
fair of course in construing it to take those 
circumstances into consideration." (Under-
scoring ours.) 
We must keep in mind what the object or the 
purpose of the power of attorney was. It cannot be 
questioned under the evidence that it was given to 
the son to be used while the father was away on a 
mission. Under the foregoing general rule even 
though the power irs given in general terms, it must 
be construed subject to and limited by the clear and 
17 
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obvious intent of the agency and the result which the 
agent is appointed to accomplish. The record is re-
plete with the expression of intent of the grantor 
Preece, Sr. It is a leading and fundamental principle 
that the authority is to he construed to give effect to 
the principal's purpose and intention in creating the 
agency. We quote from Vol. 2, C.J.S., at page 1220, 
Sec. 97, with respect to the application of the fore-
going rule: 
"That intent, and not technical reasoning 
is of prime import in the construction of the 
agents' mandate." 
To torture the power of attorney into a super-
annuated existence would defeat the very purpose 
for which it was given. This should not be tolerated. 
Again we quote from Vol. 2, CJS, a:t page 1220, 
Agency, Sec. 97: 
"A fair and liberal construction designed 
to achieve and not to defeat the ends and pur-
poses of the agreement should be given to the 
agreement, within the limits and subject to 
the operation of the principles hereinbefore 
announced ... 
* * * 
"The tenns and expressions implied are 
to be accorded an ordinary and natural mean-
ing, in the light of the purpose contemplated, 
and not to be subjected to any forced, strain-
ed, or doubtful construction, either to enlarge 
or restrict their natural import; and under no 
circumstances should construction be used as 
a device to enlarge the authority beyond the 
powers * * *" 
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The relationship of principal and agent demands 
the highest degree of honesty, loyalty and integrity 
and the utmost good faith in the agent's dealing with 
his principal. In any event, no one should be per-
mitted to enjoy the fruits of an advantage taken of 
a fiduciary relationship whose dominant character-
istic is a confidence reposed by one in another. The 
principles of equity demand that such consideration 
must be preserved to the utmost in any transaction 
involving the exercise of authority by an agent. For 
an excellent statement of this general rule see Vol. 2, 
Calif. Jurisprudence, 2d, 7'72, Agency, Section 104. 
The trial court erred in attempting to attach 
liability in an "after the fact" fashion which is con-
trary to all principles of justice and law and the 
judgment should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE ~SIGNING OF THE GUARANTEE WAS WITHIN 
THE PURPOSE OR INTENT OF THE POWER OF AT-
TORNEY AND THE AGENCY CREATED THEREBY. 
For the reasons heretofore cited and under the 
applicable law the signing of the guarantee by W. J. 
Preece some six years after it was given is not bind-
ing on Preece, Sr. While the power was exercised 
by the son in connection with transactions involv-
ing the savings or checking account of Preece, Sr. 
while he was away on a mission, no further attempt 
was made to exercise the power until over four 
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years after Preece, Sr. returned from his mission. 
The power of attorney was given for a particular 
purpose and the law relating to the problem is care-
fully set out in Vol. 2, CJS, Page 1229, Agency, Sec. 
99, as follows: 
"Whether any particular act or transac-
tion is comprised within the authority grant-
ed depends upon its relation to the purpose 
of the agency, as being usually or necessarily 
connected with the accomplishment of that 
purpose * * * A distinct and independent 
power cannot be made to spring by implica-
tion from the grant of another distinct power; 
land an act which is 'adverse to the interests 
of the principal and not eon templated to bene-
fit him, being obviously not such as is neces-
sary or usual in the proper accomplishment of 
the objects df the agency, is clearly outside 
the authority. 
In the ca'Se at bar there is no connection what-
soever with the signing of the guarantee and the 
accomplishment of the purpose of the power of 
attorney, i.e., conducting Preece, Sr.'s affairs while 
away on a mission. The signing of the guarantee 
was defiinitely adverse to the interests of the prin-
cipal, Preece, Sr., and could not be said to have 
benefitted him. Under Utah law Preece, Sr. is not 
bound. See Huntsman v. H1.c,ntsman ( 1920) 56 Utah 
609, 192 P. 368 and Howard v. National Copper 
Bank et al. (1933) 81 Utah 493, 20 P.2d 610. 
The actions of the former agent in signing the 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
guarantee were clearly outside the authority grant-
ed. This would be true even if the power of attorney 
could have been said to have been in effect at the 
time of the signing of the guarantee in 1960 because 
the signing of the same was not necessarily or 
usually connected with the accomplishment of the 
objects of the agency, or for the benefit of the prin-
cipal. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE 
POWER OF ATORNEY IN EVIDENCE. 
It is apparent from even a casual review of the 
evidence that the purpose or object for which the 
power of attorney was given had been accomplished. 
The power of attorney therefore terminated as a 
matter of law upon the return of Preece, Sr. to the 
United States from abroad. (See Vol. 22, Am. Jur. 
50, Agency, Sec. 56) Its admission into evidence 
over objection was reversible error. If the po·wer 
of attorney and the agency created thereby was not 
terminated upon Preece, Sr.'s return from abroad 
it would be, as a matter of general law, terminated 
within a reasonable time thereafter. There rs no 
basis in fact or law for attempting to justify the 
trial court's holding that the power of attorney was 
still in effect as an unreasonable period of time had 
lapsed prior to the abortive and wholly unauthorized 
act of W. J. Preece. It is clear from the record that 
no attempt was made by W. J. Preece to exercise 
the power from the time his father returned from 
hrs mission in 1955 until1960. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the act of W. J. 
Preece in signing the guarantee was not within the 
intent, purpose or scope of the agency created by 
the power of attorney. The power of attorney was 
not effectual for any purpose in 1960 as more than 
a reasonable time had expired and the purpose for 
which the power of attorney was given had been 
accomplished. The intent and circun1Htances in con-
nection with the giving of the power of attorney 
compel the conclusion that William V. Preece, appel-
lant herein, should not be subjected to lilability. 
There is no legal authority or rule of law which 
holds that such acts of a former agent are proper. 
To allow an agent to execute such an instrument 
wholly outside of the scope of the agency would aid 
to greatly deceive and defraud innocent persons, 
and completely disrupt the necessary everyday use 
of a power of attorney. 
The judgment of the trial court was wholly 
erroneous as to the appellant and should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERL C. RITCHIE 
Of the Firm of MOYLE & MOYLE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
810 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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